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America has conducted itself in the post-Cold War era with the understanding that fostering democracies and
encouraging military establishments subject to the rule of law are vital to US national security interests.[1] In this
regard, the warfighting unified commands mirror the overall US national security policy of peacetime engagement not
only by maintaining close contacts with allies and friendly governments for the purpose of imparting values and ideals
associated with democratic principles, but by focusing this commitment through detailed engagement plans.
For example, in a document entitled "Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime Engagement," General Charles E.
Wilhelm, Commander in Chief of US Southern Command from 1997 to 2000 (now retired), set out his vision for Latin
America and the Caribbean as "a community of democratic, stable, and prosperous nations . . . served by professional,
modernized, interoperable security forces that embrace democratic principles, demonstrate respect for human rights,
are subordinate to civil authority, and are capable and supportive of multilateral responses to challenges."[2]
In addition, recognizing that there is a legal dimension to almost every aspect of the US Southern Command
engagement plan, the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate developed and published a first-ever legal engagement
strategy in 1998.[3] The intent of the legal engagement strategy is to promote the concept of professional law-based
militaries that operate in accordance with the rule of law, respect internationally recognized human rights,[4] and are
subordinate to and controlled by democratically elected civilian governments. In short, the US Southern Command
legal engagement strategy is a blueprint for democracy-building in the context of the rule of law. In the quest for war
avoidance, this legal engagement plan is a unique force multiplier and contributes to the "shaping" dimension of the
National Military Strategy.
The Importance of the Rule of Law in War Avoidance
In his groundbreaking book about warfare in the 21st century, Race to the Swift, Richard Simpkin argues that
democracies must find "politico-legal devices" to confront the enemies that threaten today's societies, and that the
armed forces of a democracy must carry out their duties in conformity with the rule of law. Simpkin states,
"Democratic governments rest on the rule of law, and must so rest.[5]
The term "rule of law" was initially coined to refer to the common law system of jurisprudence with particular
emphasis on equality before the courts. The more modern common meaning, however, encompasses those rules and
legal standards of behavior recognized and practiced between states in the context of the community of nations, and
connotes consistency in the application of democratically passed and impartially implemented and enforced national
laws and regulations. In the words of University of Virginia law professor John Norton Moore, the importance of the
rule of law is central to international relations: "Law . . . is vitally important. Even in the short run, the [rule of] law
serves as a standard of appraisal for national actions and as a means of communicating intentions to both friend and
foe, and perceptions about lawfulness can profoundly influence both national and international support for particular
actions."[6]
In tandem with Professor Moore's admonishment, the Clinton Administration's Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright,
said that of all the problems facing the Southern Hemisphere, none is more important than improving adherence to the
rule of law. "Where justice is absent," Albright writes, "peace and stability of a nation and its neighbors come under

threat; where justice is partial, citizens who do not have access to equal treatment lose faith in their government, and
the forces of extremism grow strong; and where justice is unprofessional, crime flourishes, corruption grows, and
economies suffer."[7] If it is obvious that justice cannot be achieved without adherence to the rule of law by all levels
of society, it is particularly true that a nation's military and security forces must also embrace the rule of law.
Promoting the rule of law is not merely an end worthy unto itself; in the quest for war avoidance and promoting the
full range of human rights, there are great benefits to both the United States and the world at large. In fact, recognizing
a nexus between the nation that mistreats its own citizens and the nation that fosters aggression against its neighbors,
both the preamble and Article 1 of the UN Charter leave no doubt that justice, human rights, and the fundamental
freedoms of all mankind are at risk, and aggressive war an almost inevitable outcome, when democratic principles and
the rule of law are ignored.[8]
In other words, the fostering of democracies makes the world more secure because, in the words of former national
security advisor Anthony Lake, "Democracies tend not to wage war on each other and they tend not to support
terrorism--in fact, they don't."[9] Indeed, it seems intuitively obvious that activities pursued by democracies are
substantially better than the activities pursued by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, which characteristically exhibit a
blatant disregard for the rule of law.
So, as many commentators have noted, the new paradigm for war avoidance turns out to be a very straightforward
model: If democracies make better neighbors, it is certainly in the best interests of the United States to do all it can to
foster all emerging democracies and to thereby enlarge respect for the rule of law in international relations. If
democracies are better neighbors, the United States must expend the necessary time, effort, and capital to effectively
assist those nations that have exhibited the political will to embark on democracy's path. And nowhere has the desire
for democracy and the rejection of repression been more evident than in the amazing, and still ongoing, transformation
of governments in Latin America.
The Military in the Emerging Democracies of Latin America
Latin America's desire for democracy is seen in the remarkable transformation that has taken place in the context of
how people are governed. Just over ten years ago some 90 percent of Latin American countries functioned under some
form of undemocratic military rule. Today, all but one of these countries operate under popularly elected civilian
governments. The Western Hemisphere is now virtually all democratic, Cuba being the most obvious exception.
Nevertheless, as one would expect, a number of Latin American countries are experiencing serious troubles in
establishing or maintaining the institutions necessary for the full blessings of democracy.
While assistance to the democracies in Latin America is needed at every possible level, of utmost concern in the
evolutionary transition from totalitarianism to democracy is defining the appropriate role of the military forces there. In
Latin America, the militaries of the new democracies are often a decisive factor in who governs. Unfortunately, the
chief legacy of the undemocratic past is that those militaries have a limited frame of reference for operating under
principles associated with the rule of law. On the contrary, coming out of a tradition in which the ruling elite of the
totalitarian state maintained power by using special units of the armed forces as a primary instrument of repression
against the people, in many cases the military itself was viewed as the chief abuser of human rights.[10]
Simply put, the totalitarian regimes relied on components of the military establishment to maintain power and to
suppress any threat--internal or external--by any means. Human rights, the rule of law, and civilian control were alien
concepts. Thus, if the new democracies are to stabilize and flourish, subordinating the military to civilian control
befitting a democratic system in which the soldier can carry out his mission in accordance with the principles of
human rights is absolutely essential. In short, a hallmark of a successful democracy is the military's full acceptance of
the fundamental principles of the rule of law.
A law-based military is a key component of successful democratic reform. In a democracy, the military cannot be an
independent actor; it must take directions from the government and be accountable to society for the way it carries out
those directions. The central question, then, is how best to help instill solid rule-of-law values in the armed forces.
Since rule-of-law values become solid and irreversible only through the development of institutions designed to
promote them, institutionalization must be the criterion. Teaching a few classes to a military audience on US

democratic traditions, for instance, is not a solution. Rule-of-law values must be institutionalized through a systematic
approach that provides the necessary inculcation. Remarkably, the leaders of military and security forces throughout
the Latin American region have embraced--or at least recognized and accepted--the need for civilian control of the
government, including the military, and in many cases, their efforts to promote military reform have served as the
catalyst for institutional changes in the nation's civilian political institutions.
Legal Engagement Model
Promoting the rule of law in the new democracies involves questions and issues which, because of their disparate
nature, cannot be assigned to the jurisdiction of any single agency or department of the US government. Still, because
of the nature of the problem--promoting the full range of rule-of-law issues to host-nation militaries--the matter is best
spearheaded by the US military's uniformed lawyers, its judge advocates.[11] Judge advocates serve as an action-based
resource capable of advising and responding to a variety of legal problems. Traditionally, judge advocates are tasked
to provide support to the US military in the context of military justice, military administration, legal assistance,
contracts, procurement, international law, and law-of-war issues. In general, the principal function of any judge
advocate is to provide advice on legal matters to the commander and his staff to ensure that all activities are carried out
in accordance with US domestic and international law.
The very existence of a uniformed legal corps serves as a way to institutionalize the American commitment to the
positive values of military proficiency and ethical integrity in the armed forces. In addition, by doctrine, lawyers
oversee all of the regulatory requirements associated with providing training in the laws of war[12] and code of
conduct to all US soldiers.[13] As a result, few militaries in history can match the record of the US military as it has
functioned under the rule of law, whether in the realm of respecting the law of armed conflict, providing a fair system
of justice for its soldiers, or operating under civilian control.[14]
The Southern Command's lawyers faced a novel and formidable challenge in crafting an effective legal strategy to
support the unified commander's engagement efforts while taking into account US operational and security concerns,
cultural diversity, mistrust of US intentions, resentment of US power and influence, unfamiliarity with different legal
systems that were oftentimes dysfunctional and corrupt, and a natural resistance to change. Nevertheless, after
recognizing the key role a proactive rule-of-law program would play in supporting Southern Command's theater
engagement efforts, the Staff Judge Advocate's Office conceived and crafted a coherent legal engagement strategy to
help build rule-of-law programs, effect necessary reforms within the military justice systems of those countries
interested in reform, and support military reformers within the national ministries of defense in their efforts to
professionalize and legitimize their military and security forces. This legal engagement strategy focuses on working
cooperatively with nations in the region, other government agencies, and international organizations[15] in order to
reinforce the importance of military institutions embracing the rule of law by adhering to domestic laws and
international legal standards of behavior.
The cornerstone of Southern Command's legal engagement strategy is an annual symposium called the "Legal
Symposium on Defense and Security Issues," held annually in Miami, Florida. The symposium is an intensive fourday conference that brings together the senior military leaders and their legal advisors from throughout the region. The
purpose of the symposium is to fully explore the relationship that exists between commanders and their military legal
advisors in a democracy. Because effective legal reform requires the full support of the senior leaders of the host
nation, the symposium places special emphasis on demonstrating to the senior foreign line officers the necessity of a
law-based professional military legal corps, and the importance of the rule of law in meeting regional threats and
challenges. This is accomplished through detailed lectures, panel discussions, and working sessions devoted to realworld issues. Throughout these exchanges, concrete examples are provided on how military legal advisors can act as
force multipliers over the full range of operational issues.
As a by-product of the annual symposium, a number of defense ministries have requested US assistance in defining
how the law should properly function in their military establishments and, further, how the military itself should fit
into a more democratic form of government that is serious about promoting human rights. The Staff Judge Advocate's
Office serves as a forward-based resource capable of advising and responding to the variety of problems, sometimes
enormous, confronting many of the emerging and struggling democracies. This support ranges from supplying basic

information on how the US military adheres to the rule of law, drafting codes of military justice, reforming antiquated
military justice systems, and assisting the foreign militaries in creating and training their own professional legal corps.
Obviously, in a constrained resource environment, all the requests cannot be pursued simultaneously. Therefore,
consistent with the priorities established by US Southern Command's Strategic Engagement Plan, the legal office
focuses on those areas and countries that have the highest priority for support. Priority is determined by a number of
factors, including the importance of the country to US national security interests, a demonstrated willingness to effect
reforms within the military, and support from the civilian leadership. Furthermore, a primary concern in the assessment
process centers on how effectively, over the long-term, a nation's military leadership can be encouraged to accept a
reduced and more professional role appropriate to a democracy and remain loyal to a democratically elected civilian
government.
A successful strategy to achieve this long-term goal must be based on two overall themes directed toward the host
military and appropriate government officials: (1) foster greater respect for, and understanding of, the principle of
civilian control of the military; and (2) improve military justice systems and procedures to comport with
internationally recognized standards of human rights.[16]
Two examples of US Southern Command's ongoing legal engagement efforts are representative--one in Colombia and
the other in Venezuela.
Colombian Human Rights Training
Recognizing that the militaries in many of the emerging and struggling democracies have a slim frame of reference for
properly handling human rights issues, a major focus of the legal engagement strategy is to promote, strengthen, and
assist the host nation's armed forces in institutionalizing human rights training. A representative and highly successful
example of how the legal engagement plan operates is seen in a recently completed two-year project to fully
institutionalize human rights training in the Colombian military. This long-term assistance effort stands as a model for
other rule-of-law initiatives in other regions.
One of the major obstacles in imparting concepts relating to human rights and democratic principles is that many of
the democracies in Latin America are typically faced with the social and economic turmoil traditionally associated
with low-intensity-conflict environments, ranging from economic chaos to actual armed insurgency. Thus, the
effectiveness of any program of assistance must be measured against the realities associated with the specific problems
facing the host nation.
Nowhere in the world do the multiple forces of insurgency, terrorism, and drug-trafficking threaten social order more
than in Colombia. Foremost in the Colombian fight for survival is maintaining the legitimacy of the military as it
conducts operations against a number of insurgency groups, foremost of which is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). A major step in solidifying the legitimacy issue is to inculcate human rights and law-of-armedconflict training into the government's armed forces.
In October 1998, the then-Deputy Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, Major General Alfred Valenzuela,
directed the legal office to assist the Colombian military in institutionalizing human rights and law-of-war training in
the nation's entire armed forces. General Valenzuela personally secured the support of the Colombian Ministry of
Defense to this end and was absolutely instrumental in subsequently obtaining the necessary funding from the
Secretary of the Army's Latin American Cooperation Fund.[17]
While the Colombians expressed a desire to receive human rights instruction, there was little, if any, standardized
methodology to teach human rights to its soldiers. There existed no military legal facility designed and equipped to
train Colombian commanders in these specialized legal areas. Clearly, Colombian soldiers in the field had to be given
adequate and meaningful human rights training if they were to be held accountable and if they were expected to be
better prepared to cope with the abuses of terrorists. Furthermore, this training had to be institutionalized into the
fabric of the Colombian military system so that human rights training would be a continuous requirement for all
soldiers. Cultural, language, and social barriers suggested the best chance for success would be for Colombian
instructors to deliver the actual subject-matter presentations.

Ultimately, the legal office, working in conjunction with Southern Command's Human Rights Division,[18] the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and Colombian human rights experts, developed and then executed a
concept plan that produced a human rights and law-of-war handbook to be used as the standard training guide for the
entire Colombian military. Over 500,000 copies of the handbook were printed in Colombia, and a cadre of Colombian
officers was trained in two train-the-trainer courses on how to "teach the handbook." The end state of this project is to
have Colombian instructors train every soldier and to institutionalize the handbook's contents as mandatory training for
all future soldiers.
The apparent success of this effort in Colombia must be tempered by the fact that human rights training can be
effective only to the degree that it is inculcated into the psyche of the military. At a minimum, the Colombians now
have a standardized human rights training handbook that is truly their own. It is now up to the Colombians to continue
the effort. In this regard, the strategy to keep the US role as that of a helper and not as an overseer has paid
tremendous dividends. If the Colombian military is successful in coming years, the success will be due to their
continuing commitment to teach human rights and the law of war. Teaching and training, of course, must go hand-inhand with investigating abuses and holding the guilty accountable. As a by-product of this initial effort and continued
engagement with the Colombian senior military leadership, US Southern Command is currently providing assistance in
creating a new Colombian military legal corps as well as instituting additional military justice reforms. While much
work remains to be done, one cannot help but be cautiously optimistic that we have planted the seeds of a professional
military organization, free from corruption and accountable to its citizens.
Venezuelan Military Justice Reform
In Venezuela the focus was different. After the 1998 symposium, Venezuelan military officials requested Southern
Command's assistance in creating, as mandated by new legislation, a completely new court-martial system with oral
advocacy as its centerpiece. Traditionally, criminal and civil justice systems in Latin America have not used
adversarial courtroom proceedings to render judgments. Appointed judges act as prosecutor, defense attorney, judge,
and jury. Written testimonials are gathered, other documentary evidence is submitted by the parties concerned, and the
judge, with no imperative for expeditious processing, eventually renders a decision. As a result, defendants often
languished for years in jail awaiting trial unless they could bribe their way out. The decisionmaking process was
usually secretive, and judges were never held accountable for their judgments. Indeed, there was no way of
determining how judges arrived at their verdicts, and the system was obviously prone to corrupting and illegitimate
influences.
The Venezuelan justice system was typical of this endemic problem. Consequently, the Venezuelan legislature passed
a law requiring both civilian and military courts to change to a system similar to the adversarial process used in the
United States. At a loss as to how to proceed, the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense requested Southern Command's
assistance. After several meetings and visits to observe US trial procedures, a plan of action and milestones were
developed and approved by both sides.
Over a period of approximately ten months, US judge advocates, working closely with their Venezuelan counterparts,
drafted a new manual for courts-martial, set up training programs for Venezuelan military lawyers, conceived and
drafted procedures for the conduct of trials, and arranged for visits to Puerto Rico to observe adversarial trials as they
were conducted in the Spanish language. As a result of these intensive efforts, on 1 July 1999 the Venezuelan military
inaugurated the first-ever adversarial trial system in all of South America. Since then, Southern Command has
continued to make available various training programs. For instance, Southern Command provided funding for a team
of experts from the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to provide training on the use of scientific test results and
their introduction into evidence. Additionally, US judge advocates have been provided as trial observers to offer
follow-on advice and assistance in the development of trial advocacy skills. Interestingly, the civilian court counterpart
to the military justice system, which was supposed to have also converted to the adversarial system, has not yet, at this
writing, implemented the legislatively mandated reforms. However, civilian court officials have started sending
prosecutors and other attorneys to the military lawyer training courses and are using the newly instituted military
justice system and procedures as the model for their reform efforts.

Southern Command subsequently has received a number of requests to support comparable changes in military justice
systems throughout the region. Similar efforts are currently under way in Honduras and Guatemala, and plans are
being developed to support requests from Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia.
Lessons Learned
The Colombian and Venezuelan initiatives serve as a blueprint for the Southern Command's legal engagement plan.
From these two cases, eight general points are worthy of consideration.

. First, as demonstrated throughout the Colombian initiative, any program to promote human rights values within
foreign militaries must be built upon institutionalizing those values into the fabric of that force. Obviously, this goal
can be achieved only through a systematic program designed to institutionalize these concepts. In the past, the United
States has not recognized the importance of institutional reform. Instead, US programs relied on a variety of disjointed
military security assistance initiatives to try to instill human rights values compatible with democratic principles in
individual foreign soldiers. Since US efforts were geared only at exposing the individual foreign soldier to human
rights ideals, institutional reform within the host-nation military never occurred. Essentially, the promotion of human
rights and democracy was an indirect, hoped-for benefit at best rather than an explicit goal. Programs designed merely
to have US personnel teach human rights or the law of armed conflict on one or more occasions will have only limited
long-term results and will fail to instill pride and responsibility into the host military, which comes from designing and
delivering their own human rights curricula for training.
This "train-the-trainers" approach is distinguishable from any other program in that it assimilates the target country's
military command structure at all stages of the process in the development of a course to train its own soldiers in
human rights law. This approach promises success because the target military is more likely to follow through with
programs if its top military commanders have invested the time and resources needed to develop them. There is a
direct positive correlation between the host nation viewing the program as an indigenous effort and the amount of real
support that is provided. The concept of training the trainer places the cost and the reward where it belongs, with the
host country.

. Second, formal requests for these types of long-term assistance must always originate from the recipient government.
Again, this is the purpose of the annual legal symposium. In this way, the matter of assistance is never framed as to
what the United States is going to do, but what the two nations can do together. In this manner, the host nation is
engaged in the reform effort at the beginning of the process. In Colombia, the idea of developing some type of
effective human rights training had been percolating for several years. In Venezuela, the military leadership looks to
the United States and Southern Command as the best place to support its mandated legal reform efforts. Furthermore,
since the US representatives in-country best know the local politics and personalities, their complete support is
essential. The lesson to apply in future efforts is fundamental: only a unified US team working together with its hostnation counterparts toward a common long-term objective will be able to launch and sustain a successful program.

. Third, closely related to developing solid requests for assistance from the host nation is the task of getting a firm
commitment for the end result, real programmatic change. Since the task of institutional reform may require a total
restructuring of the current system, including the elimination of programs that are counterproductive, the complete
cooperation of the senior leadership of the host nation is absolutely essential. This commitment must be obtained as
soon after the US site survey assessment as possible.

. Fourth, once the host nation has agreed to the concept of long-term reform, it is important that the US working team
not get too far out ahead. Sensitivity is critical. Planners must take into account nationalistic and other characteristics
peculiar to each military in developing a reform curriculum, whether in regard to military justice reform or human
rights and law-of-war training.

. Fifth, one idea that needs further exploration is the concept of increased regional military cooperation in rule-of-law

reform initiatives. In the project on human rights and law-of-war training, for example, the Staff Judge Advocate's
Office and the Human Rights Division of US Southern Command are now working in Venezuela using the Colombian
handbook as a model. Further, at a subsequent conference in Caracas on military justice reform attended by 15
countries, Southern Command proposed the creation of an area-wide, centrally located, JAG school. This school would
teach military and operational law to Spanish-speaking military lawyers and would serve as the professional legal
development school for the region. While few countries have the resources to run their own schools, they could instead
contribute funds and other resources (for example, instructors and supplies) to such a cooperative school, and the
United States could provide additional support and training to this one central program for legal education. Ultimately,
the proposed school also could provide legal training to commanders and staff officers to sensitize them to the legal
issues associated with military operations.

. Sixth, as in all relations with foreign nations, one needs to be particularly sensitive to concerns from the opposite end
of the domestic political spectrum in the host nation. In this vein, the possibility exists that an opposition group might
seize on any US-assisted program as the opening wedge to advance its own anti-US agenda. Efforts to make the list of
political participants and "organizers" as broad as possible are helpful in defusing this potential problem. In Colombia,
the US team brought into the process as many civilian human rights groups as it could.

. Seventh, a distinctive characteristic of a long-term program is the need to stay engaged. Indeed, quality control
requires that the US military continue to monitor a program once it has been instituted. In this context, measurable
standards for positive advancement need to be developed. This can be done by counting the number of soldiers trained
and by closely following the reports of human rights violations. It is essential that contacts be maintained to allow the
institutionalization to grow from the roots. Planners for future efforts must understand that such initiatives are not
isolated events; tracking the program is just as critical as establishing the program. Measures of effectiveness must be
developed and constantly analyzed to ensure that progress, however defined, is continually being made in protecting
human rights, ensuring a procedurally fair and efficient military justice system, promoting the professional
development of military lawyers, and--this is critical--cultivating an understanding and appreciation on the part of
commanders and military leaders, civilian and uniformed, of the importance of seeking legal advice before initiating
military operations.

. Finally, as we have seen with the Colombian initiative, it is crucial to institutionalize and advocate the need for legal
input in all phases of military operations and training. In this regard, the legal office arranged to have various
Department of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs instructions and directives mandating legal reviews of all
operation and concept plans translated into Spanish and distributed at a recent legal symposium. Further, the Staff
Judge Advocate has personally provided copies to senior civilian and military leaders in Colombia, Ecuador, Chile,
and Nicaragua, recommending that they be used as models for instituting mandatory legal reviews to ensure
compliance with domestic and international law. Experience has demonstrated that it is only through top-down,
mandated change that the natural resistance to such efforts will eventually be overcome. Ultimately, without the full
and willing participation of the military leadership, these changes will have shallow roots and be doomed to wither and
fail.
Conclusion
In addressing the issue of promoting the rule of law in the militaries of Latin America, the empirical studies that have
conclusively demonstrated the murderous behavior of totalitarian governments stand as a great motivator for reform.
As former University of Hawaii Professor R. J. Rummel stated: "The way to end war and virtually eliminate
`democide' appears to be through restricting and checking power. This means to foster democratic freedom."[19]
Through its legal engagement strategy, US Southern Command offers an innovative but realistic program that can
make a difference by providing the lasting benefits of institutional democratic reform. By any standard of evaluation,
the two initiatives discussed here stand as valuable models for offering meaningful help. For simplicity, focus, and
potential for positive change, the legal engagement strategy has no equal--it targets institutional change and strives to
ensure that the military forces of these new democracies are stake-holders and equal partners, if not leaders, in building

and sustaining democratic reforms.
If the United States is serious about promoting peace and human rights, it is time to abandon mere showcase
approaches to supporting the rule of law. Rather, as Southern Command continues to demonstrate under the new
Commander in Chief, General Peter Pace, it is time for the United States to seek great things, to roll up its sleeves and
help enlarge the number of true democracies in the world community. The blueprint for success exists. One need look
no further than Southern Command's legal engagement strategy and the Strategy of Cooperative Regional Peacetime
Engagement it supports.
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